Theses from the Short Side (Part III)
From short theses of Wolfpack Research and Fuzzy Panda Research.
Wolfpack Research short thesis on Datavault AI Inc. ( DVLT 0.00%↑ )
Wolfpack Research’s newest report on DVLT 0.00%↑ reads less like an investment note and more like an exposé. The firm calls DVLT “one of the most shameless stock promotions of all time”—a recycled penny-stock shell now dressed up in the language of AI, blockchain, and quantum computing. Beneath the marketing, Wolfpack finds little more than empty offices, fake partnerships, and a CEO previously sanctioned by the SEC.
From WiSA to Datavault: How a Failure Rebranded
DVLT was born from the wreckage of WiSA Technologies, an audio-hardware company whose stock had already fallen 99.99 %. In late 2024 it executed a reverse merger with EOS Technology Holdings, run by CEO Nathaniel Bradley—a figure previously fined and banned by the SEC for false COVID-19 claims. The “acquisition” transferred what Wolfpack calls “imaginary intellectual property” into WiSA in exchange for $210M in stock, instantly rebranding the failed firm as an “AI and quantum data powerhouse.”
The supposed “Data Vault Platform,” marketed as a breakthrough in data monetization, turned out to be a thinly populated NFT exchange hosting absurd or inappropriate listings—everything from “Dean’s List Tokens” to “Vladimir Putin Vomiting.” Almost all uploads trace back to DVLT employees.
A Quantum Center That Doesn’t Exist
In October, DVLT issued a press release announcing the grand opening of a 22,000-square-foot Center for AI and Quantum Computing Excellence near Atlanta. Wolfpack visited the address: what they found was a 2,800-square-foot office with one employee and no servers, no labs, and no data centers. Other addresses listed by the company included a coworking space in Manhattan and—most bizarrely—a New Jersey hair salon run by co-founder Sonia Choi, Bradley’s spouse.
Wolfpack calls the “Quantum Center” a “pure fabrication designed to generate headlines, not revenue.”
Partnerships That Vanish on Contact
DVLT’s news flow is filled with impressive-sounding partnerships that collapse under scrutiny:
Burke Products, labeled a “global defense contractor,” is actually a small Ohio parts supplier with just $3M in annual government orders.
Nature’s Miracle Holding (NMHI) supposedly agreed to pay $2M for a carbon-credit token system; it recently reported $9,511 in cash.
Scilex Holdings (SCLX) allegedly pledged $150M in Bitcoin to fund DVLT’s “supercomputer.” SCLX’s own filings show less than $5M in cash.
Wellgistics Health (WGRX)—another “partner”—has <$500k in cash and a trail of dilutive financings.
Wolfpack concludes that DVLT’s “collaborations” are press-release theater masquerading as business development.
A Cast of Repeat Offenders
The report traces DVLT’s leadership through a web of penny-stock promotion and regulatory trouble:
Nathaniel Bradley: fined and barred by the SEC in 2021; now back running another public vehicle.
Edward Withrow III: a convicted felon and co-inventor on DVLT’s patents, previously pled guilty to a pump-and-dump scheme.
Stanley Mbugua: CFO of two former SPAC darlings (Skillz and Presto Automation) that collapsed after SEC scrutiny.
Fuzzy Panda Research short thesis on Eos Energy Enterprises ( EOSE 0.00%↑ )
Fuzzy Panda Research’s latest report on EOSE 0.00%↑ is one of the most scathing short theses of 2025. The firm accuses the company of defrauding the Department of Energy (DOE), concealing a lethal gas hazard in its battery technology, and fabricating most of its reported backlog to justify drawing down a federal loan. It calls Eos “a company hiding a deadly gas problem while feeding the DOE three sets of financials.”
The Deadly Gas Problem
According to whistleblowers, FOIA records, and emergency response reports, Eos’s zinc-bromine batteries have repeatedly leaked hydrogen bromide, a highly toxic gas that exceeds OSHA safety limits. At least ten such incidents occurred at customer sites and Eos’s own facilities in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, leading to factory shutdowns and worker hospitalizations.
Former safety executives described “thermal events” that caused batteries to melt down, releasing gas concentrations in excess of 100 parts per million. Despite these events, Eos continued marketing its batteries as “non-toxic” in investor materials and refused to conduct safety studies. The report includes fire department records, confirming repeated off-gassing incidents at Pine Gate Renewables, Indian Energy’s Viejas project, and Eos’s headquarters.
Even worse, Fuzzy Panda alleges Eos dumped damaged batteries improperly, allowing toxic zinc bromide to leak into waterways near its Turtle Creek, Pennsylvania plant.
False Financials and the DOE Loan
Eos secured a $303M DOE loan in 2024 — but former executives say it did so by submitting falsified projections. CEO Joe Mastrangelo allegedly ordered staff to “goal-seek whatever numbers were needed” to meet loan conditions. Fuzzy Panda says Eos keeps three different versions of its financial model: one for internal use, one for investors, and one inflated for the DOE.
Under the loan terms, false statements constitute an immediate event of default, which would render $90.9M immediately due — about half of Eos’s cash balance. Former executives believe the DOE’s discovery of these misrepresentations could trigger a total loan clawback. The report claims Eos also failed to disclose its toxic gas risks to regulators, violating environmental covenants in the loan agreement.
A Worthless Backlog
Former executives estimate that up to 80% of Eos’s reported backlog is “worthless.” FOIA filings, legal documents, and satellite imagery show that many projects either don’t exist, have been canceled, or involve bankrupt or fictitious counterparties.
Among the examples:
Pine Gate Renewables, Eos’s largest customer, experienced catastrophic performance failures and hydrogen bromide leaks. Engineers told Fuzzy Panda the batteries achieved only 42–55% efficiency — versus the 75% Eos advertised — and Pine Gate now refuses to buy from Eos.
Carson Hybrid Energy Storage, accounting for 31% of Eos’s backlog, was blocked by local regulators two years ago; court filings show the “binding” LOI allowed only promotional press releases, not sales.
EnerSmart switched from Eos’s batteries to BYD’s lithium-ion systems.
IEP, a key partner run by a friend of the CEO, is described by former executives as “not real” — an unfunded shell with $251,000 in cash and executives who don’t even list IEP as their employer.
These and similar deals make Eos’s $8B market cap “a fantasy built on paper contracts,” according to Fuzzy Panda.
Uneconomic Batteries and Failing Economics
Even without the legal and safety issues, Fuzzy Panda argues that Eos’s technology is fundamentally uncompetitive. Its batteries cost 2× more than lithium-ion alternatives, have 30–40% failure rates, and degrade faster than expected.
Former engineers revealed that material costs alone are higher than the company’s selling price: Eos spends $180,000 in materials to make a battery it sells for $68,000. At best, the firm’s gross margins remain negative 43% even at scale.
FOIA documents from the California Energy Commission confirm the same story — lower efficiency, faster degradation, and frequent shutdowns. “The more Eos sells,” the report says, “the more money it loses.”
A Culture of Concealment
Inside Eos, Fuzzy Panda describes a toxic culture of intimidation led by CEO Joe Mastrangelo, who allegedly forbids employees from writing anything negative via text or email to avoid documentation. The company has churned through four CFOs and three chief commercial officers in five years. Former executives say Mastrangelo “doesn’t have a strong moral compass” and prioritizes optics over transparency.
The firm also alleges double-counted revenue from NextEra batteries that had to be replaced, and $11 million of obsolete electrolyte left on the books instead of written down.